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Abstract
Algebraic immunity (AI) is a property of a Boolean function f that measures its sus-
ceptibility to an algebraic attack. If f has a low algebraic immunity and f is used in an
encryption protocol, then there are ways to successfully cryptanalyze the system. As a
result, it is important to have an efficient means to compute the algebraic immunity of
Boolean functions. Unfortunately, algebraic immunity is one of the most complex crypto-
graphic properties to compute. For example, it is significantly more difficult to compute
than nonlinearity [2]. Here, we show the advantage of a reconfigurable computer in comput-
ing a function’s algebraic immunity. For example, we show that a reconfigurable computer is
4.9 times faster than a conventional computer in this computation for 5-variable functions.
Indeed, we compute the distribution of functions to algebraic immunity for all 5-variable
functions, a computation that has not been previously accomplished. Interestingly, the
problem we address is to design a logic circuit that computes a characteristic of a logic
function.
1 Introduction
Any stream or block cipher can be described by a system of equations expressing the ciphertext
as a function of the plaintext and the key bits. An algebraic attack is simply an attempt to
solve this system of equations for the plaintext. If the system happens to be overdefined, then
the attacker can use linearization techniques to extract a solution. However, in general, this
approach is difficult, and not effective, unless the equations happen to be of low degree. That
is (somewhat) ensured if, for instance, the nonlinear Boolean function combiner in an LFSR-
based generator (a widely used encryption technique) has low degree or the combiner has a low
algebraic immunity (defined below) [4, 5].
Let F2 be the two-element field and Vn = Fn2 be the vector space of dimension n over
F2, consisting of n-bit tuples, with the usual vector operations. Let an LFSR be filtered by
a Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn) of degree d, where another function L : Fn2 → Fn2 defines
the LFSR. Suppose the keystream z0, z1, z2, . . . is computed from some initial secret state (the
“key”) given by n bits a0, a1, . . . , an−1 in the following way. Let a = (a0, a1, . . . , an−1) be the





· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
zt = f(L
t(a)).
The problem of extracting the plaintext message in this context is equivalent to the problem
of finding the initial key a, knowing L and f , and intercepting zi. Since deg(f) = d, every
term on the right hand side of any of the above equations is one of the monomials made up of








monomials, and we define a variable yj for each one of them. If a cryptanalyst has access to at
least N ≥M keystream bits zt, then he/she can solve the linear system of N equations for the
values of the variables yj , and thus recover the values of a0, a1, . . . , an−1. If d is not large, then
the cryptanalyst may well be able to acquire enough keystream bits so that the system of linear
equations is highly overdefined (that is, N is much larger than M).






, where ω is the well–known “exponent of Gaussian reduction” (ω = 3
(Gauss-Jordan [11]); ω = log2 7 = 2.807 (Strassen [12]); ω = 2.376 (Coppersmith-Winograd
[3])). For n ≥ 128 and d ∼ n, we are near the upper limits of this attack for actual systems,
since the complexity grows with d.
Courtois and Meier [5] showed that if one can find a function g with small degree dg such that











. That is easy to see, since f(Li(a)) = zi becomes g(L
i(a)) · f(Li(a)) = 0 =
zi g(L
i(a)), and so, we get the equations g(Li(a)) = 0, whenever the intercepted zi 6= 0. That










. Therefore, it is necessary to
have a fast computation of a low(est) degree annihilator of the combiner f .
2 Background and Notation
2.1 Introduction
The objects of our study are Boolean functions f : Vn → F2 (see [6] for more properties on
Boolean functions).
Definition 2.1. The degree d of a term xi1xi2 . . . xid is the number of distinct variables in
that term, where ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Definition 2.2. The algebraic normal form or ANF of function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a polyno-
mial expression of f consisting of the exclusive OR of terms.
The ANF of a function is often referred to as the positive polarity Reed-Muller form.
Definition 2.3. The degree, deg(f), of function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is the largest degree among
all the terms in the ANF of f .
Example 2.1. The ANF of the majority function (in 3 variables) is f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕
x1x3 ⊕ x2x3. Its degree is 2.
Definition 2.4. Function a is an annihilator of function f if and only if a · f = 0, where
a 6= 0.
Note that f¯ is an annihilator of f . Further, if a is annihilator of f , so also is α, where α ≤ a
(’≤’ is a partial order on the set of vectors of the same dimension, that is, (αi)i ≤ (βi)i if and
only if αi ≤ βi,∀i).
Definition 2.5. Function f has algebraic immunity k = min{deg(a)|a is an annihilator of
f or f¯}.
Example 2.2. The annihilators of f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 include f¯ and all g such
that g ≤ f¯ , excluding the constant 0 function. In all, there are 15 annihilators of f and 15
annihilators of f¯ . Among these 30 functions, the minimum degree is 2. Thus, f(x1, x2, x3) =
x1x2⊕x1x3⊕x2x3 has algebraic immunity 2. Table 1 shows all 15 annihilators of the 3-variable
majority function.
Example 2.3. Let n = 4. The function f = x1x2x3x4 has the highest degree, that is, 4.
Function a = x¯1 = x1 ⊕ 1 annihilates f , since a · f = x¯1x1x2x3x4 = 0. Since, x¯1 has degree 1
and there exists no annihilator of f of degree 0, the algebraic immunity of f is 1. To reach this
conclusion, it is not necessary to check the annihilators of f¯ , since the only annihilator of f¯ is
f , which has degree 4.
We can immediately state
Lemma 2.1. The algebraic immunity of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is identical to the algebraic
immunity of f¯ .
Table 1: Functions that annihilate the 3-variable majority function and their degree
x1x2x3 f α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 α9 α10 α11 α12 α13 α14 α15
000 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
001 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
010 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
101 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
111 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Degree 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3
More specifically,
Lemma 2.2. The algebraic immunity of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is min{deg(α)|α ≤ f¯ or α ≤
f}.
Proof The hypothesis follows immediately from the observation that {α|α ≤ f¯ or α ≤ f} is the
set of all annihilators of f .
Lemma 2.2 is similar to Definition 2.5. However, there is an important difference. Lemma
2.2 admits an algorithm for determining the algebraic immunity of a function f . Specifically,
examine the degree of each function α such that α ≤ f¯ and determine the minimum degree of
the ANF among all α. This requires the examination of 22
n−wt(f) − 1 functions, where wt(f)
is the number of 1’s in the truth table of f , since f¯ has 2n − wt(f) 1’s in its truth table. In
forming an annihilator, each 1 can be retained or set to 0. The ‘−1’ accounts for the case where
all 1’s are set to 0, which is not an annihilator. The following result is essential to the efficient
computation of algebraic immunity.
Lemma 2.3. [5, 9] The algebraic immunity AI(f) of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is bounded;
AI(f) ≤ dn2 e.
3 Computation of Algebraic Immunity
3.1 Row Echelon Reduction Method for Algebraic Immunity Compu-
tation
There are several methods for computing the algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f .
Besides the brute force algorithm (check every function to see if it is an annihilator of the
given f , or its complement), one can also use an approach in which one can identify directly
the annihilators with high degree. Since our attempt is to implement the algebraic immunity
computation on a reconfigurable computer, we have not implemented the more recent algorithm
of Armchnecht et al. [1], which also deals with fast algebraic attack issues. Our approach is
based on a simpler version of that linear algebra approach. This enabled us to implement it on
the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer and to display the AI profiles for all functions on Fn2 , for
2 ≤ n ≤ 5. A similar approach has been used to compute algebraic immunity on a conventional
processor [5, 9] . Our implementation is the first known using Verilog on an FPGA.
Here, we create the ANF of a minterm corresponding to each 1 in the truth table of the
function. Our approach to solving this system is to express this in reduced row echelon form
using Gaussian elimination that is based on two elementary row operations: 1. interchange two
rows, and 2. add one row to another row. A simple test applied to the reduced row echelon
form determines if there is an annihilator of some specified degree.
3.2 Example
To illustrate, consider solving the algebraic immunity of the majority function f(x1, x2, x3) =
x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3. The top half of Table 2 shows the minterm canonical form of f¯ . Here, the
first (leftmost) column represents all binary three tuples on three variables. The second column
contains the truth table of the complement function f¯ , which is expressed as x¯1x¯2x¯3 ∨ x¯1x¯2x3 ∨
x¯1x2x¯3∨x1x¯2x¯3, or more compactly, as the sum of minterms m0∨m1∨m2∨m4. This represents
the annihilator of f with the most 1’s.
The columns are labeled by all possible terms in the ANF of an annihilator. Then, 1’s
are inserted into the table to represent the ANF of the minterms. For example, since the top
minterm, m0 = x¯1x¯2x¯3 = (x1⊕1)(x2⊕1)(x3⊕1) = x1x2x3⊕x2x3⊕x1x3⊕x1x2⊕x3⊕x2⊕x1⊕1,
its ANF has all possible terms, and so, there is a 1 in every column of this row.
Note that we can obtain the ANF of some combination of minterms as the exclusive OR of
various rows in the top half of Table 2. This follows from the observation that mi∨mj = mi⊕mj .
For example, one annihilator a is a = x¯1x2x¯3 ∨ x¯1x¯2x¯3, and so the ANF of a is generated by
simply exclusive ORing the rows associated with these two minterms.
Table 2: Functions that annihilate the 3-variable majority function
ANF Coefficient → c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1 c0 Minterms
Index x1x2x3 f¯ x1x2x3 x2x3 x1x3 x1x2 x3 x2 x1 1
Original
0 000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 m0
1 001 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 m1
2 010 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 m2
3 011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 m4
5 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reduced Row Echelon Form
0 - - 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 m1⊕m2⊕m4
1 - - 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 m0 ⊕m4
2 - - 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 m0 ⊕m2
3 - - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 m0 ⊕m1
4 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.3 Elementary Row Operations
Consider a 0-1 matrix and two row operations: 1. interchange one row with another, and 2.
replace one row by the exclusive OR of that row with any other row. Using elementary row
operations, we seek to create columns, starting with the left column with only one 1 (called a
pivot).
3.4 Row Echelon Form
Definition 3.6. A 0-1 matrix is in row echelon form iff all nonzero rows (if they exist) are
above any rows of all zeroes, and the leading coefficient (pivot) of a nonzero row is always strictly
to the right of the leading coefficient of the row above it.
Definition 3.7. [14] A 0-1 matrix is in reduced row echelon form iff it is in row echelon
form and each leading 1 (pivot) is the only 1 in its column.
Consider Table 2. The top half shows the truth table of f¯ . For each 1 (minterm - m0, m1,
m2, and m4) in the f¯ column (third column), the ANF of that minterm is expressed across the
rows. To form an annihilator of f , we must combine one or more minterms using the exclusive
OR operation. The bottom half of Table 2 shows the reduced row echelon form of the top half.
The row operations we used to derive the bottom half from the top half can be inferred from
the rightmost column. For instance, the entry m0⊕m1 in the bottom half of the table indicates
that the rows labeled m0 and m1 in the top half of the table were combined using the exclusive
OR operation.
Note that, like the top half of Table 2, the rows in the reduced row echelon form combine to
form any annihilator of the original function. This follows from the fact that any single minterm
can be formed as the exclusive OR of rows in the reduced row echelon form. For example, m1
is obtained as the exclusive OR of the top three rows of the reduced row echelon form.
The advantage of the reduced row echelon form is that we can simply inspect the rows to
determine the annihilators of lowest degree. For example, in the reduced row echelon form, the
top row represents an annihilator of degree 3, since there is a 1 in the column associated with
x1x2x3. Since the pivot point has the only 1 in this row, the only way to form an annihilator of
degree 3 is to include this row.
The other three rows each have a pivot in a column associated with a degree 2 term. And, the
only way to have a degree 2 term is to involve at least one of these rows. Since there are no other
rows with a pivot point in a degree 1 or 0 term, we can conclude that there exist no annihilators
of degree 1 or 0. Thus, the lowest degree of an annihilator of f (= x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3) is 2.
3.5 Steps to Reduce the Computation Time
The matrices for which we seek a reduced row echelon form can be large. For example, each
matrix has 2n rows, of which we manipulate only those with 1’s in the function. Potentially,
there are also 2n columns. However, we can reduce the columns we need to examine by a few
observations. Recall that no function has an AI greater than dn2 e. Thus, we need consider only
those columns corresponding to ANF terms where there are dn2 e or fewer variables. However, it
is not necessary to consider columns corresponding to terms with exactly dn2 e variables. This is
because if no annihilators are found for a function f (or its complement) of degree dn2 e − 1 or
less, it must have an AI of dn2 e.
We can reduce the computation of the AI of a function by another observation. If a degree
1 annihilator for a function is found, there is no need to analyze its complement. Even if the
complement has no annihilators of degree 1, the function itself has AI of 1. On the other hand,




A Verilog program was written to implement the row echelon conversion process described above.
It runs on an SRC-6 reconfigurable computer from SRC Computers, Inc. and uses the Xilinx
Virtex2p (Virtex2 Pro) XC2VP100 FPGA with Package FF1696 and Speed Grade -5. Table 3
compares the average time in computing the AI of an n-variable function on this FPGA with the
rate of a typical microprocessor. In this case, we chose the IntelrCoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor
running at 2.26 GHz. This processor runs Windows 7 and has 4 GB of RAM. The code was
compiled using Code::Blocks 10.05. The data shown is from a C program that also implements
the row echelon conversion process.
4.2 Computation Times
Table 3 compares the computation times for AI when done on the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer
and on an Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor. The second, third, and fourth columns show
the performance of the SRC-6 and the next two columns show the performance on the Intelr
CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor. The last column shows the speedup of the SRC-6 over the
Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor. The second column shows the average number of 100
MHz clocks needed by the SRC-6. The third column shows the average number of functions per
second. The fourth column shows the number of functions. In the case of n ≤ 5, all functions
were enumerated, and in the case of n = 6, a subset of random functions was enumerated. The
fifth column shows the average number of functions per second on the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo
P8400 processor, while the sixth column shows the number of functions. The last column shows
the speedup of the reconfigurable computer over the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor.
For example, for n = 5, the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer is 4.9 times faster than the Intelr
processor. For n = 4, the SRC-6 is 1.9 times faster. However, for n = 6, the processor is actually
faster than the reconfigurable computer. In the case of n = 6, a sample size of 25,000,000 was
used for the SRC-6 and 500,000,000 for the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor. For all lower
values of n, exhaustive enumeration was performed.
Table 3: Comparison of the computation times for enumerating the AI of n-variable functions
on the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer versus an Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 microprocessor
SRC-6 Reconfigurable Comp. IntelrProcessor
Clocks per Functions # Functions # Speed-
n function per second samples per second samples up
2 46.3 2,162,162 16,000,000* 4,186,290 16,000,000* 0.5
3 70.7 1,414,130 25,600,000* 1,317,076 25,600,000* 1.1
4 75.5 880,558 65,536,000* 458,274 65,536,000* 1.9
5 348.4 287,012 4,294,967,296* 59,029 4,294,967,296* 4.9
6 78.0 12,823 25,000,000 17,699 10,000,000,000 0.7
* Exhaustive enumeration - All n-variable functions were enumerated.
4.3 Comparing the Row Echelon Method to Brute Force
Table 4 compares the row echelon method, which involves the solution of simultaneous equations
with the brute force method discussed earlier for the case of n = 4. In both cases, 65,536 functions
were considered, all 4-variable functions. The last row shows that the row echelon method is
able to process 1,325,000 functions per second verses 81,160 for the brute force method, resulting
in 16.3 times the throughput
Table 4: Comparing the Brute Force Method With the Row Echelon Method on 4-Variable
Functions
Brute Force Row Echelon
# Functions 65,536 65,536
Total Time (sec.) 0.807 0.050
Total Clocks 80,748,733 4,946,111
Clocks Per Function 1,232.1 75.5
Functions Per Second 81,160 1,325,000
4.4 Distribution of Algebraic Immunity to Functions
Table 5 shows the number of functions with various algebraic immunities for 2 ≤ n ≤ 6. This
extends the results of [13] to n = 5. In our case, the use of a reconfigurable computer allows this
extension. The entries shown in bold in the column for AI = 5 are exact values for previously
unknown values. The entries shown in bold and italics for AI = 6 are approximate values for
previously unknown values. In this case, the approximate values were determined by a Monte
Carlo method in which 500,000,000 random 6-variable functions were generated (or 2.7×10−9%
of the total number of functions) and their algebraic immunity computed. For n = 5 and n = 6,
the number of functions with algebraic immunity 1 are known. However, Table 5 shows the value
0 for the number of functions with algebraic immunity 0 (there are actually 2, the exclusive OR
function and its complement). This is because the Monte Carlo method produced no functions
with an AI of 0. The italicized value, 1,114,183,342,052, in Table 5 is an estimate of the number
of 6-variable functions with algebraic immunity 1. To show the accuracy of the Monte Carlo
method, compare this to the previously known exact value 1,081,682,871,734 [13]. The estimated
value is 3% greater than the exact value.
Table 5: The number of n-variable functions distributed according to algebraic immunity for
2 ≤ n ≤ 6.
AI\n 2 3 4 5 6
0 2 2 2 2 (2) 0
1 14 198 10,582 7,666,550 (1,081,682,871,734) 1,114,183,342,052
2 0 56 54,952 4,089,535,624 1,269,840,659,739,507,264
3 0 0 0 197,765,120 17,176,902,299,786,702,300
TOTAL 16 256 65,536 4,294,967,296 18,446,744,073,709,551,616
Bold entries are previously unknown. Bold and italicized entries are estimates to previously
unknown values.
4.5 Resources Used
Table 6 shows the frequency achieved on the SRC-6 and the number of LUTs and flip-flops
needed in the realization of the AI computation for various n. The frequency ranges from 109.4
MHz at n = 4 to 87.5 MHz for n = 6. Since the SRC-6 runs at 100 MHz, the 87.5 MHz value
is cause for concern. However, the system works well at this frequency. For all values of n,
the number of LUTs, slice flip-flops, and occupied slices were well within FPGA limits. Indeed,
among all three parameters and all values of n, the highest percentage was 11%.
Table 6: Frequency and resources used to realize the AI computation on the SRC-6’s Xilinx
Virtex2p (Virtex2 Pro) XC2VP100 FPGA.
n Freq. # of Total # of # of occu-
(MHz) LUTs Slice FFs pied Slices
2 103.1 2,066( 2%) 2,977(3%) 2,089( 4%)
3 113.0 2,199( 2%) 3,011(3%) 2,157( 4%)
4 109.4 2,343( 2%) 2,760(3%) 2,120( 4%)
5 100.9 5,037( 5%) 4,110(4%) 3,780( 8%)
6 87.5 8,990(10%) 3,235(3%) 5,060(11%)
5 Concluding Remarks
We show that a reconfigurable computer can be programmed to efficiently compute the algebraic
immunity of a logic function. Specifically, we show a 4.9 times speedup over the computation
time of a conventional processor. This is encouraging given that algebraic immunity is one of the
most complex cryptographic properties to compute. This is the third cryptographic property
that has benefited from the highly efficient, parallel nature of the reconfigurable computer. The
interested reader may wish to consult two previous papers: nonlinearity [10] and correlation
immunity [7].
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